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Abstract:After contrasting obscurantism with bullshit, we explore some ways in which obscurantism
is typically justified by investigating a notorious test-case: defences of Lacanian psychoanalysis.
Obscurantism abuses the reader’s natural sense of curiosity and interpretive charity with the promise
of deep and profound insights about a designated subject matter that is often vague or elusive. When
the attempt to understand what the speaker means requires excessive hermeneutic efforts, interpret-
ers are reluctant to halt their quest for meaning. We diagnose this as a case of psychological loss
aversion, in particular, the aversion to acknowledging that there was no hidden meaning after all, or
that whatever meaning found was projected onto the text by the reader herself.
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“The demand I make of my reader is that he should devote his whole life to reading my works.”
—James Joyce
To the memory of Frank Cioffi (1928–2012)
Let There Be More Light
HOW IS IT POSSIBLE to be deluded by obscurantist writings? “Philosophy is a battle
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language”, wrote Ludwig
Wittgenstein, a philosopher who was, as it happens, himself occasionally accused
of obscurantism. The charge of obscurantism suggests a deliberate move on behalf
of the speaker, who is accused of setting up a game of verbal smoke and mirrors to
suggest depth and insight where none exists. The suspicion is, furthermore, that the
obscurantist does not have anything meaningful to say and does not grasp the real
intricacies of his subject matter, but nevertheless wants to keep up appearances,
hoping that his reader will mistake it for profundity. This promise of a deep insight
into intriguing subject matters is often sufficient to lure the audience into a futile
quest for understanding.1
1 Sometimes concepts borrowed from highly technical disciplines like quantum physics or mathematics
are invoked, which adds to an illusion of profundity. See Sokal and Bricmont (1998) for a copious list of
examples.
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Obscurantism (<lat. obscurans, “darkening”) should not be confused with bull-
shit. Bullshitting, according to Harry Frankfurt’s classic analysis, occurs when one
does not really care about epistemic attitudes towards the claims proposed, and one
demonstrates a lack of seriousness when it comes to normative questions as to what
should be taken seriously and what should not. “The fact about himself that the
bullshitter hides . . . is that the truth-values of his statements are of no central
interest to him” (Frankfurt, 2005, p. 45). The bullshitter’s pronouncements can be
crystal clear; it is just that he does not care about commitments that come with the
language game of assertoric language use. Obscurantism, on the other hand, seems
to apply, first and foremost, to the content of what is being asserted: although often
presented with utmost seriousness and intellectual bravado, it is never quite clear
what the obscurantist is getting at, even though he explicitly presents his nebulous
discourse as serious and profound insights into some subject matter that, we are
told, requires “indirect” approaches.2 The charge against the bullshitter is that he
does not care about the epistemic status of what he says, whereas the charge against
the obscurantist is that we do not have a clue about what he is talking about, and we
suspect that he may be dazzling us on purpose. While the bullshitter seems indif-
ferent to truth and to whether his claims are accepted by his audience, the obscu-
rantist has a firm grip on how to tie his audience to his pronouncements. In this
sense, the obscurantist is a more dangerous and pernicious character than the
bullshitter.
Our case study of obscurantism concerns the reception of Lacanian psychoanaly-
sis (Buekens, 2005, 2006), a cluster of doctrines and “insights” that had a profound
influence on philosophy, literary criticism and cultural studies in the 1980s and
1990s. We explore a suite of apologetic arguments by followers of Lacan to the
effect that the obscurity and multidimensionality of Lacanian theory reflects the
very nature of the psychoanalytic unconscious and hence illustrates profound
Lacanian insights.3 Such arguments can best be viewed as examples of epistemic
defence mechanisms, which offer a theory-internal rationale for fending off criti-
cism (as explored in Boudry and Braeckman, 2011). As we will argue, obscurant-
ism works by seducing readers into seeking hidden truths in a text and thereby
binding them to pronouncements by getting them engaged in an endless
hermeneutic struggle to “understand” the deeper meanings conveyed by the obscu-
2 Neither should obscurantism be equated with “being difficult”. Donald Davidson is often considered a
“difficult” philosopher, but few people would argue that his writings were obscure. Crystal-clear prose may
conceal lack of arguments – clear and bold assertions have a seductive power. The fact that Quine’s
arguments for the indeterminacy of translation, for example, have been reconstructed in various and often
inconsistent ways illustrates that eloquent prose does not exclude elusiveness. Still, Quine himself could
hardly be accused of obscurantism.
3 We do not, of course, claim that obscurantism in general can be reduced to the use of empty concepts.
See infra for other rhetorical strategies.
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rantist. Obscurantism need not be a deliberate exercise in the art of seduction. As
we have argued elsewhere (as explored in Boudry and Braeckman, 2011), success-
ful beliefs systems often display an internal rationale, including their appeal to
potential audiences, their mechanisms of psychological commitment, and their
resilience in the face of critical scrutiny. The obscurantist may be an ordinary
impostor, but he may also be deluding himself, or taken in by the belief system.
Obscurantism may then simply be seen as a strategy that has been unwittingly tried
and tested over time, and without any deception on the part of the obscurantist.
But the author is not the only actor in the plot. We also discuss the complicity of
the intended or preferred audience in the creation and maintenance of obscurant-
ism, either by justifying obscurantism or by emulating his style in their interpre-
tations. In the concluding part we put forward a cognitive explanation of how
obscure statements force the reader into accepting the statements as true and to see
their author as a unique source of truths. Insights from philosophy of language and
cognitive psychology – interpretive charity, loss aversion and the sunk cost fallacy
– explain how readers can end up as “followers”.
Obscured by Lacanian Clouds
In “Must Do Better”, Timothy Williamson (2006) has argued that avoiding obscure
statements is a token of intellectual courage. The default position seems to be
that obscurity is obstructive to communication, and cannot be tolerated without
some special justification – as when, for example, we touch areas that fall under
Wittgenstein’s notorious “things one cannot speak of ”. Even a notorious obscu-
rantist like Nostradamus had a special excuse up his sleeve: he had to make his
predictions impenetrable in order to protect himself from the Inquisition. Likewise,
readers of Jacques Lacan display at least an awareness of the intellectual virtue of
clarity by the mere fact that they devise explanations and rationalizations as to why
the Parisian oracle speaks in riddles. The official purpose of their interpretations is
often simply to clarify what he said, and when different or even incompatible
interpretations see the light of day, this testifies only to the “rich” and “profound”
character of his insights.4
The core of Lacan’s version of psychoanalysis revolves around a few central
themes: the unconscious that is structured as a language, the primacy of the
signifier, our inability to grasp meaning and comprehend each other, the fictional
structure of truth, the ineluctable “lack” that is the result of our entering the domain
4 Nietzsche (1986) was perhaps too moralistic about obscurantism: “The essential element in the black
art of obscurantism is not that it wants to darken individual understanding, but that it wants to blacken our
picture of the world, and darken our idea of existence.”
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of the Symbolic, the obscure object of desire, etc. Many critics of Lacan have taken
issue with the conceptual incoherence of the different versions of his theory (Sokal
and Bricmont, 1997; Buekens, 2006; Borch-Jacobsen, 1991). In a summary dis-
cussion in the infamous Livre noir de la psychanalyse (The Black Book of Psycho-
analysis), published in 2005, philosopher Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen argued that
psychoanalysis, in its many (often incompatible) versions, is an empty theory (“une
théorie vide”): its key concepts, he argued, are “empty signifiers” that could be
interpreted at will (similar conclusions were drawn by Cioffi, 1998). The vicissi-
tudes of such central concepts like jouissance, the Other, the objet petit a or
enigmatic claims such as that the unconscious is structured like a language or that
The woman does not exist are such that no one really understands what they mean
or what they have meant in the hands of their originator.
We distinguish two ways in which a theorist can make his doctrine impervious to
criticism. On the one hand, he may bring forward external, theory-neutral argu-
ments as a means for deflecting criticism. On the other hand, he may draw on
theory-internal arguments and rationalizations for coping with criticism. Boudry
and Braeckman (2011) have designated the former “immunizing strategies” and the
latter “epistemic defence mechanisms”. Immunizing strategies consist of general
and theory-independent arguments, such as radical relativism about truth (“truth is
always relative to a discourse, so your arguments miss the point since you’re
speaking a different type of discourse”), certain forms of social constructivism
(“Every discourse creates its own version of the world, so your criticism does not
apply to my paradigm”), or general informal fallacies (ad hominem arguments,
straw man, false dilemma, etc.). Epistemic defence mechanisms, by contrast, are
derived from the theory or belief system under scrutiny, which makes them par-
ticularly interesting for explaining its seductive power and internal rationale. We
concentrate on the latter in the remainder of this article.5
Conceptual Obfuscations
Lacan’s pronouncements are couched in a number of highly abstract and complex
concepts – the Other, the Symbolic, the objet petit a, jouissance, the Phallus, etc. –
which are notoriously difficult to understand. Indeed, even among Lacanians there
is no consensus about their meaning (Nobus, 1998) and deep theoretical divides
continue to exist within the Lacanian community. An instructive example is the
5 The conceptual distinction between theory-independent and theory-internal arguments made here is
not a strict one. An argument that was initially developed as an immunizing strategy may over time be
integrated into the structure of the theory (e.g., the elusive nature of psi in parapsychology), thus blurring
the distinction between immunizing strategies and defence mechanisms (Boudry and Braeckman, 2011).
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pivotal concept of the big Other, which Lacan characterizes as an abstract “locus”
in the psychic structure of the subject that can be “occupied” by a range of different
signifiers/objects. These are said to represent or function as the Other for the
subject. If one consults and compares different Lacanian interpreters, it turns out
that the Other can stand for other individuals, society, the law, moral order, the
mother-figure, the psychoanalyst himself, the opposite sex, a person’s own body,
Language, images or even – according to Slavoj Žižek – the simulated reality in
The Matrix. While it is argued that all these phenomena are said to “occupy” the
“position” of the Other, no meaningful conceptual unity can be discerned. A close
analysis of the Lacanian literature reveals that concepts like the Other function as
container terms with which any anthropological phenomenon can be described. In
a paper entirely devoted to the concept, Derek Hook characterizes “the Other” as a
“vanishing-point of inter-subjectivity”, as “simultaneously ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ ”,
and that the Other is “both embodiment of the social substance and yet also the site
of the unconscious” (Hook, 2008, p. 51).
Lacanian theory suggests a straightforward intra-theoretical justification for
these theoretical problems, which appeals to Lacan’s idiosyncratic version of
Saussurian linguistics:Of course the concepts of the Other and the Real are difficult
to explain coherently, we are told by the Lacanian theorist, because meaning can
never be fully grasped, and as human beings we will always be trapped in a web of
signifiers. Lacan teaches us that signifiers can only refer to other signifiers, and
together they form a closed system from which we can never escape. When we
speak, we are not aware of what we are saying. “ ‘I’ is spoken by a desire outside
my consciousness that drives me” (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 56), and thus we are being
spoken (‘ça parle’)” (Lacan, 1966). According to Madan Sarup, the unconscious
“becomes not only the subject matter but, in the grammatical sense, the subject, the
speaker of the discourse. . . . Lacan believes that language speaks the subject, that
the speaker is subjected to language rather than master of it” (Sarup, 1992, p. 80).
Indeed, some Lacanians believe that the very nature of the subject matter of
Lacanian theory escapes rational discourse and scientific evaluation (Leguil-Badal,
2006). As Lacan himself put it, “The real, one has to say, is without any law. The
genuine real implies the absence of law. The real does not have any order” (Lacan,
2005, pp. 137–138).6
Similarly, we are told that the many apparent paradoxes and contradictions in
Lacan’s theory reflect the divisiveness and structural “lack” characterizing the
human subject. According to Lacan, when the child is introduced into the Symbolic
order, the psychic structure of the infant develops into “knots” that are irreducible
6 Original text: “Le réel est, il faut bien le dire, sans loi. Le vrai réel implique l’absence de loi. Le réel
n’a pas d’ordre.”
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to theoretical formulation and always escape comprehension. Lacan has designated
this ineluctable lack as the locus of the objet petit a, a concept which, as Lacanian
interpreter Bruce Fink himself acknowledges, “can take on many different guises”
(Fink, 1997, p. 52). According to Lacan, the objet petit a is that aspect of the Real
that cannot be represented, that forms a structural break in the chain of signifiers.
“The [object] a is what remains irreducible in the advent of the subject at the locus
of the other, and it is from this that it is going to take on its function” (Lacan, 2004,
p. 189). The later Lacan coined the term “sinthome” for that which is beyond
meaning and unanalysable in the so-called topology of the human mind. Other
Lacanian concepts fulfil similar roles:
The Borromean knot marks the outer limit of Lacanian theory, the point where the formalising
ambition of the matheme finally collapses into the non-theorizable, the untranslatable real of the
symptom. (Thurston, 1998, p. 158)7
In the same vein, some Lacanians have tried to explain (and justify) the institutional
crisis of psychoanalysis in theory-internal terms. Reflecting on the many theoretical
schisms following the death of Lacan, and the feuds over his intellectual legacy,
Nobus writes that knowledge is always “in a state of continuous dispossession”, and
this has (of course) something to do with the mysterious Other:
If psychoanalytic knowledge is by definition a knowledge in failure, isn’t the crisis legitimacy a
necessary precondition for the discourse of the analyst to sustain itself? Perhaps the only agency that
could ever be in the position of owning psychoanalysis is the (unconscious of the) analysand, the
Other of psychoanalytic discourse . . . (Nobus, 2004a, p. 222)
It seems then that one can construe Lacanian arguments to the effect that the very
idea of “questioning” the truth of Lacanian psychoanalysis is deeply misguided,
because according to Lacan truth itself has a “fictional structure”. As Lacanian
interpreter Bruce Fink wrote in relation to the question of the scientific value of
Lacanian theory:
The fact remains that science is a discourse. . . . it implies a dethroning of Science and a reassess-
ment of science as one discourse among many. . . . Lacan’s discourse theory suggests that there are
as many different claims to rationality as there are different discourses. (Fink, 1995, p. 138)
Another intriguing defence mechanism in Lacanian psychoanalysis directly
appeals to Freud’s conception of dreams as decipherable rebuses in the
7 This theme has been taken up in the postmodern literature, by people like Derrida and his followers.
“The play of difference ensures that meaning is always divided from itself. Reading is a kind of ongoing
experience of this internal division in, and dispersion of, meaning”, writes Josh Cohen (2010), à propos
Jacques Derrida. Ask yourself: if you really understand what this means, you will inevitably agree with it.
If you disagree, you can always be accused of being a superficial reader who “doesn’t understand Derrida”.
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Traumdeutung (Freud, 1953a, 1953b).8 We are told that Lacan’s work is a “rebus”,
just as dreams are: underneath a manifest dream content is hidden a latent dream
content, the correct reconstruction of which will reveal a web of repressed desires
that cast a shadow over the dreamer’s life (Lacan, 1966, p. 470). Freud’s model of
the dream and its alleged meaning can easily be applied to Lacan’s writings:
It does not seem unfair to characterize Lacan’s writings in this way (as a rebus) . . . [f]or their
substance deals with the nature of the unconscious as Freud understood it, hence with that dimension
of human experience that lies beyond the ken of conscious, rational discourse and emerges into
awareness only through a din of diffraction that may assume many forms – in the case of dream, for
example, the form of a rebus. By saying, then, that Lacan’s work, in terms of its substance, is a rebus,
we mean to suggest that it is dealing with a theme that of its very nature escapes the constriction of
rational exposition. (Muller and Richardson, 1982, pp. 2–3)
Madan Sarup develops the Imitation Argument as follows:
Lacan’s writings are a rebus because his style mimics the subject matter. He not only explicates the
unconscious but strives to imitate it. The unconscious becomes not only the subject matter but, in the
grammatical sense, the subject, the speaker of the discourse. Lacan believes that language speaks the
subject, that the speaker is subjected to language rather than master of it. (Sarup, 1992, p. 80)
Sarup appeals to Lacan’s theory of the subject as constituted by language or
discourse: “language speaks the subject” and “the subject is not the master of its
discourse”. As Lacanian Paul Verhaeghe put it:
From an analytic point of view . . . the subject does not speak, it is spoken. As a result, the subject
floats on top of spoken words. Indeed, when “I” speak, I do not know what “I” am about to say, unless
I am reading it or have learnt it by heart. In all other cases “I” is spoken by a desire outside my
consciousness that drives me, sometimes with approval, sometimes without. And what I do say
always comes, in the final analysis, from the Other. (Verhaeghe, 2004, p. 56)
Lacan, we are told, serves as mouthpiece of the unconscious; his discourse is a
perfect (and therefore instructive) imitation of the unconscious.9 Dany Nobus
(2004b, p. 196) seems to confirm this view when he holds that Lacan “modeled his
own discourse on the very rhetoric of the unconscious which he believed to have
discerned in Freud’s foundational accounts of dreams, slips of the tongue and
jokes”.
Muller and Richardson (1982, p. 3) argue that Lacan’s Ecrits and the Séminaires
are “essentially a concrete demonstration in verbal locution of the perverse ways of
8 Of which Lacan said: “Cet ouvrage ouvre avec l’oeuvre sa route royale [via regia, says Freud in “über
Psychoanalyse”, MB & FB] à l’inconscient” (Lacan, 1966, p. 509).
9 The verbal puns and wordplays in Lacan’s discourse are justified as follows by Stanley Leavy: “The
theoretical basis of (his) playing with words is found in Lacan’s dictum that ‘the unconscious is structured
like a language’. In his playful punning this claim is concretized, embodied. The unconscious can speak
truthfully, revealing the identity of the logically unrelated, cognitively distorted, affectively confused
experiences” (Leavy, 1983, p. 13).
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the unconscious as he experiences it”. Analogous remarks can be found in
Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986, p. 13) and Caudill (1997, p. 5).
What to make of these claims? One of the central tenets of Lacanian psycho-
analysis holds that humans are trapped in a web of signifiers, that the real meaning
of words can never be grasped, that any interpretation runs against an objet petit a
(see below) resisting further description, and that communication “never succeeds”
(Verhaeghe, 2004). Thus, we are told that Lacan’s obscure theorizing and his
expository writing style are “a performative expression of the subject matter of the
theory itself ”.
For many followers these are suggestive and plausible explanations and perhaps
even justifications of Lacan’s obscurity. Ironically, the allegedly inscrutable char-
acter of a theory’s subject matter entails that every effort to present Lacan’s
conception of the unconscious in a more or less streamlined fashion will eventually
end up as a fatal distortion of the theory’s subject matter. Any attempt to present his
thoughts in a systematic, orderly way will therefore fatally misinterpret him (and
the unconscious). Moreover, if we are to understand Lacan, we must assume that his
discourse is the expression of his unconscious which is itself “structured like a
language”.10 But here his readers are taken hostage: the Lacanian insights reveal
themselves only if one takes the theory to be a correct imitation of the unconscious.
If one denies that Lacan’s simulation is faithful to the nature of the unconscious, the
real content of his theory will never reveal itself to the reader. The hermeneutic
circle drawn by Sarup and others is so tight that there is no space left for reasonable
dissent, and both the theory and its interpretations are conveniently immunized
against criticism.
The Rationale of Epistemic Defence Mechanisms
From the critical outsider’s perspective, to rely on arguments that presuppose the
truth of the theory one tries to defend for justifying its obscurity is obviously
question-begging. But this observation hardly reflects the persuasive force of
such arguments in the eyes of those who use them. The conspiracy theorist, for
whom the very existence of adverse evidence attests to the extreme cunning of
the conspirators, and in whose eyes disbelievers are themselves involved in the
evil plot, offers a prime example. To argue that conspiracy theorists already pre-
suppose the truth of the conspiracy, and are thus engaged in a form of circular
reasoning, will evidently be to no avail in debating them. Indeed, the fact that
10 “Le symptôme psychanalysable . . . est soutenu par une structure qui est identique à la structure du
langage . . . la structure du langage telle qu’elle se manifeste dans les langues que j’appellerai positives,
celles qui sont effectivement parlées par les masses humaines” (Lacan, 1966, p. 444).
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a belief system can account for seemingly adverse evidence, that it makes the
existence of disbelievers intelligible (and even predicts their existence), consti-
tutes compelling evidence for those who are already committed to the belief
system in question.
We now understand why, at least from a Lacanian point of view, any attempt
to criticize the conceptual structure of the theory,11 to object to its wilful obscu-
rity or to request clarity of exposition, will reveal a lack of understanding of the
Lacanian insights about language, truth and reality. We also begin to see why
Lacanian interpreters are unimpressed by critics objecting to the conceptual
vacuity of his central claims. The fundamental tenets of Lacanian theory about
the objet petit a, the primacy of the signifier and the divisive nature of the human
subject are analysed in ways that the epistemic defence mechanisms for deflect-
ing valid criticism always apply. They ensure that a critical analysis of Lacanian
theory never succeeds in affecting the system.
A key tenet in the rebuttal of this epistemic defence mechanism is the unwar-
ranted inflation of Lacan’s pronouncements in the restricted context of psycho-
analytic therapy to profound insights into the structure of language, ordinary
communication, the status of knowledge, and even the nature of reality (“the
real”). (To be sure, these extrapolations of psychoanalytic insights were already
instigated by Lacan himself, particularly in his later years.) In the act of proj-
ecting the theoretical flaws and paradoxes of their own “discourse” to any theo-
retical endeavour and elevating them to deep linguistic and epistemological
insights, Lacan and his interpreters have immunized the theory against any form
of criticism. For those impressed by Lacanian theory, the pronouncements of
the Master about language, meaning and reality in general are compelling partly
because they constitute such a remarkably apt account of the Lacanian edifice
itself. After all, what better illustration of the primacy of the signifier over the
signified and the elusiveness of meaning than Lacan’s own ever-shifting and eso-
teric conceptual apparatus? From the theory-internal perspective, the critic of
Lacanian psychoanalysis is reduced to a reader who is not attentive to the divisive
dimension of subjectivity, to someone who deliberately ignores the elusive objet
petit a of all our strivings, and who clings on to old-fashioned illusions of objec-
tivity and transparency. He refuses to “understand” Lacan. Unfortunately, the
Lacanian psychoanalyst has confused the conceptual and epistemic predicament
of his own belief system for that of the rest of the world. Paraphrasing Karl
Kraus, one of Freud’s earliest critics, Lacanian psychoanalysis is itself the
disease for which it claims to be the cure.
11 Note that our analysis does not have any bearing on Freudian psychoanalysis, which we have
criticized elsewhere and on different grounds (Boudry and Buekens, 2011; Buekens and Boudry,
2012).
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The Lunatic Is in My Head: The Trap of Obscurantism
The obscurantist exploits a number of cognitive mechanisms that enable normal
communication. To explicate what goes on, we first introduce the distinction
between understanding a speech act and properly accepting it. When X asserts
that p, his intended audience is believed (by the speaker) to be in a position
to understand the sentence uttered, but only when the audience also accepts
what X asserts, will the audience have acquired the belief that p. Acceptance of
a speech act requires a conscious decision on behalf of the intended audience,
based on information about the perceived credibility of the informant, the cir-
cumstances in which he speaks and other contextual clues that are not themselves
derived from the content of the speech act. The kind of speech act itself deter-
mines what proper acceptance consists in. For example, I accept your promise to
ψ only if I am prepared to hold you responsible for not ψ-ing at some designated
future moment. The understanding/acceptance-distinction, due to Austin (1962),
is a crucial characteristic of human communication: semantic and illocutio-
nary intentions can be successfully recognized by the intended audience,
but understanding an utterance does not require acceptance.12 Acceptance of
an assertion is a post-semantic decision in the sense that understanding is con-
ceptually prior to acceptance, although the latter is the ulterior goal of a speaker.
Sperber et al. (2010) point out that our sense of epistemic vigilance essentially
depends on this distinction: we do not and should not believe everything we
are told.13
The conceptual priority of understanding over acceptance does not reflect the
hermeneutic order of things, i.e., the strategies we employ to uncover what a
speaker means and wants us to accept. When we embark on understanding the
content of what someone asserts, we sometimes focus on what it would be reason-
able for the speaker to believe in the circumstances and then solve for the content
of what he asserts. That is, very briefly, one aspect of the principle of charity or
rational accommodation, which is itself an aspect of the cooperative nature of
communication: a speaker provides evidence to her intended audience for the
correct recognition of her semantic and illocutionary intentions, while the audience
reconstructs, on the basis of that evidence and other contextual clues, what the
speaker must have meant (Grice, 1989). The key idea is that evidence for what is
12 Semantic intentions and illocutionary intentions are successfully executed only if the intentions are
recognized by the audience. Speakers intend to be understood.
13 This seems to be a uniquely human phenomenon: “There is no strong evidence or argument for
distinguishing comprehension (understanding) from acceptance in non-human communication” (Sperber
et al., 2010, p. 365).
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meant (the content of the utterance) can sometimes be identified only if we assume
that what the speaker utters is true and thereby expresses a belief we could accept.
If the content of an assertion is a prima facie false or implausible, we normally
assume that we must have misunderstood the speaker, and seek to reconstruct a
more charitable interpretation. While we do not believe everything we are told,
there is thus an important sense in which we appeal to what can be plausibly
maintained in order to infer what the speaker meant (Davidson, 1984; Sperber
et al., 2010). We reconstruct a content for the assertion that would be a plausible
candidate for acceptance, and this in order to understand the speaker correctly.
Note, however, that charity and cooperative behaviour in conversations do not make
acceptance mandatory. Normal applications of the principle of charity tentatively
ascribe true beliefs to the speaker in order to understand his assertions, but charity
does not require that you yourself accept the particular assertion you are trying to
make sense of. Charity is consistent with epistemic vigilance.
The obscurantist’s strategy is a perversion of this cognitive mechanism: his
unspoken promise is that you will understand him full well – you will grasp the
hidden meanings and acquire a profound insight – but not before you accept his
assertions. We discern three features which tend to weaken reasonable sensitivity
to the distinction between understanding and acceptance in Lacan’s intended
audience.
First, to lure the intended or preferred audience into accepting an assertion
or set of assertions, the obscurantist should first of all convince the reader that
there is indeed a deep and profound insight lurking underneath the surface of his
prima facie incomprehensible statements. The obscurantist’s hope is to persuade
the intended reader that the hidden treasure, the true meaning, is indeed so valu-
able and so revealing that he is willing to invest a huge hermeneutic effort in
trying to understand whatever his hermeneutic efforts indicate as the “true
meaning” of what Lacan says. As Lacan himself put it in a defiant mood:
“L’écrit, ça n’est pas à comprendre. C’est bien pour ça que vous n’êtes pas forcés
de comprendre les miens. Si vous ne les comprenez pas, tant mieux, ça vous
donnera justement l’occasion de les expliquer” (Lacan, 1975, p. 35). What is in
normal conversation extrinsic to understanding – acceptance of what is asserted
– now triggers the desire to understand: “these pronouncements contain deep
truths about myself that I must accept, so what he says must make sense.” In the
case of Lacan, the accepted purpose comes down to grasping the true nature of
the (Freudian) unconscious. Lacan defines the purpose (“I offer you a deep
insight”), while the bulk of the hermeneutic work is up to the reader. This has an
interesting consequence. When interpreting Lacan his readers inevitably rely on
their own beliefs and assumptions about the unconscious to fill in the true
meaning of what Lacan asserted. As a consequence, none of his readers agree
about what Lacan “really” meant or said: their background beliefs about
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something as elusive as the unconscious are too divergent to lead to compatible
interpretations.14
The second feature is that Lacan’s pronouncements are supposed to give us
knowledge by testimony: he speaks as an authority we should rely on. According
to Sperber et al. (2010), excessive application of interpretive charity is typical for
the deferential attitude towards religious authorities, gurus and other persons with
inflated reputations:
If [people] were to check the pronouncements of these sources (for instance, “Mary was and
remained a virgin when she gave birth” or Lacan’s “There is no such thing as a sexual relationship”)
for coherence with their existing beliefs, they would reject them. But this would in turn bring into
question their acceptance of the authority of the source. A common solution to this predicament is
to engage in a variant of Davidsonian “charitable interpretation”, and to “optimize agreement” not
by providing a clear and acceptable interpretation of these pronouncements, but by deferring to the
authorities (or their authorised interpreters) for the proper interpretation, and thus accepting a
half-understood or “semi-propositional” idea. (Sperber et al., 2010, p. 382)
While every interpretation requires a certain amount of charity on behalf of the
intended audience, it cannot be allowed that, in order to understand what is being
said, one must defer to the expert on every level. This, we suggest, explains why
almost every interpretation of Lacan beginswith an explanation of his obscurantism,
and then goes on trying to understand him under the supposition that everything he
says is true: the obscurantist presents himself as the authority who possesses
knowledge – he provides testimonial knowledge and he alone, on the basis of his
psychoanalytic practice, can provide this. This rules out the possibility for his
audience to seek independent confirmation or evidence for what Lacan is claiming,
which is a key feature tomove from understandingwhat is asserted to acceptingwhat
he is being told. Both features – the promise of a deep insight and the essential
testimonial character of the pronouncements – erode the reader’s sense of vigilance.
The third feature – introducing signifiers with “open meanings” – has its roots in
another natural way of proceeding when we do not understand a contribution to a
conversation: confronted with a word you do not understand, the natural way to
proceed is tentatively to accept the statement in which it occurs as true and to “solve
for” the semantic value of the newly introduced word (this principle reflects Frege’s
sound principle that only in the context of a sentence does a word have meaning).
The obscurantist exploits this hermeneutic strategy by safely assuming that the
reader will accept his statement no matter what meaning he (the reader) has
assigned to the new signifiers. Any interpretation offered by the interpreter will
14 Note that this doctrine was canonized in post-modernism. Reading a text came to be seen as
“difficult”, and was made the subject of theories, training; only books written by experts would offer
interesting “readings”. “It always seemed as if everyone else was doing it better”, writes Thomas Karshan
(2011), “. . . but no one ever felt sure what doing it well really meant”.
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inevitably impose an ad hoc meaning to the Lacanian signifiers, and yet allow the
reader of Lacan to believe that he has gained an important insight – the one he
imposed on the text. The flip side of this phenomenon is that Lacanian concepts are
all too easily applicable: those who “understand Lacan” can apply his key concepts
at will and always give a “Lacanian interpretation” of the phenomenon at hand.
Because of its lack of interpretive constraints, Lacan’s “open discourse” creates
limitless possibilities for applications to works of art, movies, politics, culture, etc.
As Frederick Crews (2006, p. 61) put it in another context, it “leaves an academic
interpreter without even a mathematical chance of having nothing to say”. The
interpreter who “understands” Lacan inherits authority from Lacan when he dis-
seminates and applies the Lacanian concepts. He must now be recognized as a
disciple and he too provides us with essentially testimonial knowledge – he basi-
cally testifies what Lacan has meant and derives his authority from having under-
stood the master. Since his pronouncements too use the Lacanian signifiers and no
effort at disambiguation can do justice to Lacan’s contradictory pronouncements
(Evans, 1996), obscurantism spreads within the Lacanian community like a con-
tagious disease. Other features that trigger excessive charity in the reader include
denying the obvious and/or confidently asserting the non-obvious. Combined, they
explain what Borch-Jacobsen has dubbed the “emptiness” of the key Lacanian
notions.15 The strategic role of this hermeneutic game of smoke and mirrors is
to turn the process of attempting to understand Lacan into an interminable
hermeneutic exercise – so demanding of time and intellectual resources that irra-
tional forms of loss aversion start to kick in.
Loss Aversion and the Sunk Cost Fallacy
We have not yet explained how the excessive hermeneutic effort required to under-
stand Lacan makes it hard eventually to reject what he claims. First, consider how
few interpreters of Lacan have actually criticized him (see Evans, 2005, for a
notable exception), or compare how hard it is to criticize Hegel’s Phenomenology
of Spirit, for example, or Derrida’s Glas, even when the “profound insights” are
often trivial, absurd or wholly derivable from common sense (Shackel, 2005).16
15 A famous example of “denying the obvious” was Baudrillard’s statement that “the Gulf War Has Not
Taken Place”. See Norris (1992) for a rejoinder.
16 Schopenhauer (1965, pp. 15–16) on Hegel: “If I were to say that the so-called philosophy of this
fellow Hegel is a colossal piece of mystification which will yet provide posterity with an inexhaustible
theme for laughter at our times, that it is a pseudophilosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real
thinking, and, by the most outrageous misuse of language, putting in its place the hollowest, most senseless,
thoughtless, and, as is confirmed by its success, most stupefying verbiage, I should be quite right”.
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Which cognitive mechanism explains the connection between excessive her-
meneutic efforts and the tendency eventually to accept the “reading” arrived
at?
Our explanation appeals to two related psychological phenomena explored by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). As Lacan’s readers invest considerable time and
intellectual effort in deciphering his writings, they are gradually putting themselves
in a position where a significant amount of loss aversion can kick in. In economics
and decision theory, loss aversion refers to people’s tendency to prefer avoiding
losses to acquiring gains. The idea – empirically confirmed in countless experi-
ments – is that someone who loses 100 euros will lose more satisfaction than
another person will gain from a 100-euro gain. If your financial or intellectual
investment turns out to be a failure, you will be reluctant to accept your losses
precisely because your decision (to accept or reject losses) will be influenced,
irrationally, by your past investments. Your refusal to accept losses may cause you
to lose even more money, for example when a stock goes further down. Loss
aversion is closely related to the sunk cost fallacy. Rationally speaking, retrospec-
tive (past) costs that cannot be recovered should play no role in making decisions
about the future. But they do play a role. Suppose a ticket buyer has two options
when he realizes he does not like the movie: (I) sit through the whole movie or (II)
leave the cinema and do something more agreeable. A rational actor bases his
decision on whether he wants to see the rest of the movie regardless of the ticket
price. Since the second option involves suffering in only one way (spent money),
while the first involves suffering in multiple ways, the second option is obviously
preferable.
Both psychological tendencies are exploited by the obscurantist. Consider that
interpreters almost always agree with what the obscurantist is supposed to have
pronounced (how many introductions and “readings” of Lacan contain sections
critical of Lacan?). Rationally speaking, no matter how much time and intellectual
energy an interpreter has invested in studying the obscurantist, that fact itself
should not affect his evaluation of the content retrieved and of further pursuit-
worthiness. However, having invested an immense amount of research time in
trying to reconstruct what is supposed to be the “correct” interpretation, the
overcharitable interpreter is no longer willing to admit that there was no deeper
meaning at all, that his efforts were wholly unrewarding or that what he ends up
with is a trivial insight, something we knew all along. Loss aversion in this case
takes the form of a reluctance to accept that the gains were not worth the
hermeneutic effort. The interpreter avoids accepting his losses exactly the way
someone who has bought a losing stock refuses to acknowledge his bad investment.
Buying even more stocks would thus be equivalent to clinging onto the Lacanian
belief system. The irrational trader incurs ever larger debts, while the follower of
Lacan is wasting ever more time in a hermeneutic treadmill leading nowhere. Just
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as the price paid for a stock is irrationally taken to be the benchmark for its real
value, so the gigantic hermeneutic efforts are taken as indicative of the real value
of the “insights” gained. To justify his past investments, the gullible follower will
constantly apply the Lacanian framework to new cases, in the hope of finding more
hermeneutic treasures there, even when it has become transparent to any impartial
observer that there were no new insights in the first place.
Conclusion: Hanging on in Quiet Desperation
What James Joyce claimed of his literary work should not serve as advice for
philosophers. The effects of obscurantism are pernicious because the honest
reader or interpreter is forced to stretch principles of rational accommodation and
interpretive charity to unreasonable limits: while a legitimate presumption of
truth is a natural attitude in hermeneutics, in the case of Lacan the reader is
forced into a position such that if she does not accept as true what is being said,
she will never understand what the speaker intended to communicate. In normal
communication there is a limit to the charity that readers are willing to extend to
obscure theorizing.
Nevertheless, we should not be too confident of our ability to resist the tempta-
tions of the obscurantist’s promise and our capacity to avoid being taken in by him.
If readers attempt to take a critical distance from the theory, or to question the deep
insights that are supposedly hiding there, they are immediately sucked back into
Lacanian doctrine by the attractive force of its epistemic defence mechanisms, as if
they were trying to escape from a black hole (Law, 2011). Any critical reflection is
transmuted into further illustrations of profound insights. Moreover, Lacan’s
promise of meaning and insight is accompanied by a threat: if you claim you do not
understand him, if you hold that his pronouncements are meaningless, you are
dismissed as failing to have understood him, to have lived up to his requirements.
The reader is thus taken hostage not only by Lacan but also by his interpreters, who
attain the status of the guru’s infallible mouthpieces.
Traditional approaches to obscurantism put the blame squarely on the author
(Carnap blaming Heidegger, Foucault blaming Derrida), depicting readers as
passive victims intimidated by mystifications. We have argued that readers and
interpreters themselves share responsibility for defending and spreading obscurant-
ism and that they can be actively involved in the creation and maintenance of
seductive mythologies: once they are fascinated by the search for a promised hidden
meaning, and once they have experienced the seductive power of epistemic defence
mechanisms, they will try to find ways to make sense of the pronouncements of the
text under scrutiny and further legitimize its obscure character. Taking Lacanian
psychoanalysis as a case study, we have illustrated how readers are taken hostage by
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the pronouncements of the author, and how they end up rationalizing and justifying
obscurantism on their own accord.17
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